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COMMENTARY
THOUGHTS EVOKED BY "ACCOUNTING AND THE
NEW CORPORATE LAW"*
TED J. FinLis**
A.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that I.M. Counsel, the outside general counsel of Microscript,
Inc., a manufacturer of computer hard disk drives, has just reviewed the
draft of the current Annual Report to Shareholders, which includes income
statements reporting a third consecutive year of net income increases of 2025% over each prior year. As she flips through the other financials I.M.
also notes three consecutive years of positive cash flows. She pulls her feet
down from the top of her heavy walnut desk and spins in her chair,
brushing the top of the lush carpet. "Fantastic!" She is jubilant. She
congratulates herself again on having landed her firm's largest and most
profitable client.
The coup of securing Microscript as a client occurred a little over three
years ago and resulted from Counsel's very skillful representation of Venture
Funds, Inc. in a friendly takeover of Microscript. Venture had rescued
Microscript from a working capital squeeze with a $20 million capital
infusion and obtained a voting arrangement and convertible preferred with
rights to 20% of the common stock, sufficient to gain control. Venture
Funds also immediately had ensconced Quentin Fixx, a turnaround specialist,
as Chief Executive Officer, who appointed Malcolm Bath as Chief Financial
Officer. Both men were also principals in Venture Funds. Together, they
quickly cut asset carrying values in half, substantially reduced and reorganized the administrative and accounting staffs, and put the fear of God into
division managers. Fixx had reversed a rather laid-back culture at Microscript and let the managers know that it would take a 2501o annual growth
in their divisional earnings to support their bonuses and perquisites and, in
addition, lacking that growth, there was reason to fear dismissal for failure.
Fixx replaced the former auditors at the same time.
Finally Counsel's years of hard work were paying off; last year's billings
by Counsel for legal work had exceeded $2 million, although payments were
regularly many months late.
Counsel turns to her calendar to snatch a few moments to fantasize
about her well-deserved trek in Nepal next month. She brings out her
checkbook to write the $15,000 nonrefundable check to her travel agent.
Just then, the telephone rings and Penrod Whistleblower, an assistant to
* This article was prompted by a reading of the manuscript by Joel Seligman,

Accounting and the New CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943 (1993).
** Professor .of Law, University of Colorado Law School.
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the Microscript controller, in a hauntingly despairing voice asks to see her
right away. He mentions "cooked books," fdar of wiretapping, and that it
will take him an hour to get to Counsel's office.
Counsel soberly returns her unopened checkbook to her briefcase and
calls in a young new associate, Bobbie Catchett, who is known to have a
good knowledge of accounting issues. When Counsel tells Catchett that she
may want Catchett to sit in on the meeting with Whistleblower, Catchett's
eyes begin to shine with excitement. Counsel notices her own involuntary
sensation of mild disapproval, but nevertheless relates the Microscript data.
Catchett, on hearing all, breathes out a subdued "Wow," and impulsively tells Counsel that based on what she had learned in her law school
accounting course she would have suspected income manipulation two years
earlier.) Catchett suggests that because Counsel may have been on notice
of the fraud, she may wish to consider whether she might have an ethical
problem in interviewing Whistleblower, who may become a codefendant
with her in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. Catchett also
relates that innocent directors and managers may have been negligent in
failing to see the red flags suggesting possible fraud.
At this point, Counsel decides that she certainly does dislike Catchett,
but dismisses the suggestion concerning criminal implication as an inexperienced indiscretion.
Counsel narrows her eyes slightly and informs Catchett that the audited
financial statements show high profits and cash flows. In response Catchett
reviews the comparative cash flow statement in the draft Report and points
out that it shows the operating cash flow has been negative for at least two
years and that only the sale and leaseback of the firm's factory buildings
made overall cash flow positive. She also observes that the sale and leaseback
were with another client of Venture Funds and although this was disclosed,
it may raise a problem because related parties' transactions do not have the
2
protections of arm's-length deals.

1. Catchett may have been recollecting the class discussion of the REPORT OF THE
REPORTING (1987), chaired by former SEC
Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr. [hereinafter TREADWAY COMnISSION REPORT]. Included
in that report, at 125 app. E, is a Harvard Business School case study in cooked books which
bears a remarkable resemblance to the details of the Miniscribe case, on which the Microscript
hypothetical is based. Connolly v. Hambrecht & Quist Group, Civ. No. 91-M-170 (D. Colo.
Jan. 17, 1991). Even more remarkably, the Miniscribe case did not arise until three years after
the preparation of the case study. This suggests that the Miniscribe-type measures are well
known to managers bent on fraud and that knowledgeable counsel would be able to recognize
the use of these measures and be alerted to what they portend. For some of the interesting
facts of Miniscribe, see Lee Berton, How Miniscribe Got Its Auditors' Blessing on Questionable
Sales, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1992, at Al.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FiNANciAL

References here and in later portions of this paper to the Miniscribe case are largely
based on personal knowledge because the author was a consultant to the Special Committee
of the board of directors and thereafter to the trustee in bankruptcy.
2. See TED J. Finis, AccOuNTING ISSUES FOR LAWYERS 142-44 (1991); ACCOUNTING FOR

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
1990) (concerning sales and leasebacks between related parties).
LEASES,
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As to the impressive earnings, Catchett notes that balances of inventories
had increased in extraordinary amounts relative to sales over the prior year's
levels for each of the last two years. She relates that inflation of inventory,
especially after the establishment of large reserves and when early obsolescence is endemic, is a common fraudulent device and that if the figures
were false, earnings before taxes would be false on a dollar for dollar basis.3
She further suggests that the auditors should have been put on notice of
the need to look more closely by the standard "analytical review" whereby
4
they calculate inventory turnover rates.
While the two of them wait for Whistleblower, Catchett explains that
turnaround specialists almost always take "big bath" write-offs at the outset
of a job to (a) reduce future costs of goods sold, depreciation, and
amortization charges 5 and (b) establish reserves that may be raised or lowered
to facilitate upward smoothing of the earnings trend. 6 Catchett also tells
Counsel that excessive write-downs may violate Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) accounting requirements. 7 Further, Catchett relates that shuffling the accounting staff is a way of diminishing internal controls8 and
that the change of auditors is troublesome despite Counsel's assurance that
the Form 8-K SEC filing disclosing the change indicated it was "by mutual
agreement" only. 9 Catchett states that a high pressure "tone at the top"
involving incentive compensation keyed to earnings targets with personal
sanctions for failure to meet those targets commonly motivates executives
to "cook the books" and that weak internal controls facilitate such fraud.' 0
In response to Counsel's protestations that the auditors stated few defects
in controls in their management letter," Catchett says that the auditors have

3. See Fits, supra note 2, at 215-20.
4. See id. at 216 (prob. 4-1), 682-83.
5. See id. at 286-87. At this writing IBM's new CEO has just announced an $8.9 billion

charge for costs associated with a planned, but not yet executed, reduction in the work force
resulting in a quarterly loss of $8.04 billion. See Laurie Hays, IBM Posts $8.04 Billion 2nd
PeriodLoss, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at A3.
6. Write-downs are highly discretionary in both timing and amount, so abuses are
frequent. See Fiis,supra note 2, at 287:
On this question, a major abuse is the "big bath" write-off. The concern of the

SEC has been with excessive write-downs which would have the effect of improperly
increasing future reported profits because of lower depreciation charges in the future
years. As a result, as noted previously, the Commission's accounting staff places a

maximum limit on the write-down to the discounted expected net cash flow. The
minimum write-down the Commission believes should be to undiscounted expected
net cash flow. This is a very broad range for any long-lived asset.
7. Id. at 286-87.
8. The belief that this occurred in Miniscribe was a substantial basis for the claims
against auditors and management.
9. A change of auditors must be disclosed to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
within five days on Form 8-K. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11(a), -.15d-11 (1985); Form 8-K, item 4;
17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1986).
10. TREADWAY CoMIUssION REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
11. Auditors have customarily reported to management their suggestions for improving
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a limited duty to find the weaknesses and may have only a duty to report
them orally.1 2 Counsel is aware that these venture funds usually aim at
cashing out after five years with at least 20% compound annual returnsa fact which emphasizes the funds' interest in short-term performance.
Whistleblower arrives with documentation and spends three hours detailing a massive inventory fraud, proving Catchett's worst suspicions.
Furthermore, it appears that top management is heavily involved.
Catchett is distressed at the likely involvement of management-it may
preclude Microscript from recovering against its auditors for their failure
to detect the fraud. She cites the Cenco case, but states that subtle nuances
in the facts may preserve the action. 3
If Counsel had had Catchett's knowledge of accounting, as Catchett
initially implied, Counsel presumably would have been put on notice some
time ago of what Catchett suspected immediately. Two questions now come
to mind and are addressed here: Would it be reasonable to expect that
Counsel, as corporate counsel, should have had these accounting skills?
And, should law schools at least offer an elective curriculum that would
provide the basis for these accounting skills?

B.

SELIGMAN'S "AccOUNTINO AND Tn NEW CORPORATE LAW"-

IS IT

ENOUGH?

In his article, Accounting and the New CorporateLaw,' 4 Joel Seligman
does not address these questions but does make clear that for purposes of
proper governance, corporate managers and directors rely on managerial
accounting, with its emphasis on internal controls and planning-functions
that are essential to the fulfillment of their duty of care. ("Control" includes
monitoring the use of resources to assure that management's directions are
observed. It also encompasses operating and monitoring record-keeping
processes to assure their integrity. "Planning" involves such matters as
budgets, logistics, pricing, compensation, and strategic decision-making about
production, marketing, financing, and investments.) Seligman then urges
teachers in the corporations course to focus on accounting (managerial
accounting, in fact) in discussion of the duty of care of directors and
managers.

internal controls in a memorandum known as a "management letter." Internal Control Related
Communications, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 60 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1988), greatly expanded auditors' responsibilities to report these. See Fn'is, supra
note 2, at 692-94.
12. Fos, supra note 2, at 118-19, 692-94.
13. See id. at 224 (note 4-4); Cenco Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1987) (holding that company damaged by its top management
acting to defraud investors and creditors may not recover for negligence or breach of contract
in action against auditors). In Miniscribe, Cenco was strongly urged as controlling, but in the
end the auditors settled for $95 million because of distinguishing features.
14. Joel Seligman, Accounting and the New Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
943 (1993).
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Practitioners, understandably, were ahead of academics in recognizing
the importance of concepts of managerial accounting to corporate governance. This is evidenced in a statement made a decade ago by former SEC
Commissioner James Treadway, also a lawyer:
I would characterize corporate governance as an approach to management of a public company which has as its essential premise the
idea that the corporation should institute and enforce adequate
controls and procedures to assure that the corporation is operated
solely for the benefit of stockholders. Sound corporate governance
requires a structure and procedures which will preclude undesirable
activity prior to its occurrence or, if it does not preclude it, will
detect and remedy it with promptness. More specifically, corporate
governance means oversight of management by an active and questioning Board of Directors and the use of whatever other mechanisms of oversight, reporting and review-such as independent Audit
and other Committees at the Board of Directors' level and appropriate counterparts at other levels within the corporation-as are
necessary to assure that corporate managers at all levels are properly
sensitive to and discharge their paramount duty to stockholders. 5
Similarly, Seligman suggests that a corporations teacher who falls to
integrate accounting concepts in the duty of care portion of the course is
remiss. I strongly agree, and would like to illustrate the facility with which
an instructor can accomplish this goal using the existing casebooks.
In many corporations casebooks, one of the three or four duty of care
cases is Bates v. Dresser, 6 with its classic opinion by Justice Holmes. Like
Moli~re's bourgeois gentilhomme, who was surprised to learn that he had
been speaking prose for over forty years, many corporations teachers may
be surprised to learn that in addressing the duty of care through Bates they
have been teaching the adequacy of internal accounting controls.
The facts in Bates were that the bookkeeper for a bank, Coleman,
opened an account in the bank and then was allowed to receive from the
clearinghouse all checks drawn on the bank. He would then negotiate but
not charge his own checks against his account but would either charge them
against other customers' accounts or decrease the credits for deposits of
other customers. The result was an understatement of liabilities to other
customers and an overstatement of the liability to Coleman.
"T" accounts may be used to illustrate each of Coleman's techniques.
Here we are aided by the fact that most students understand what is meant
when a bank "credits" one's account. For example, to illustrate undercrediting other customers' accounts, assume that before the fraud Coleman's

15. James C. Treadway, Remarks to American Soc. of Corp. Secretaries, Inc. (Apr. 13,
1983), in Frns,supra note 2, at 623-24. The accounting profession's most controversial debate
today is over the role of auditors with respect to internal controls. See Thomas P. Kelley, The
COSO Report: Challenge and Counterchallenge,J. AccT., Feb. 1993, at 10.
16. 251 U.S. 524 (1920).
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balance is $100 and those of all other depositors aggregate $1000. In
executing the fraud, Coleman negotiates a check for $50. In addition, other
customers deposit $100. Coleman's fraudulent failure to debit his own
account and under-crediting of other accounts for only $50 would appear
as follows:
Coleman Account

Opening balance

.

Other Customers' Accounts

$100

Opening balances $1000
New deposits
50
New balance

$1050

The nonfraudulent accounting would have been:
Coleman Account
Payment $50 Opening balance
New balance

$100
$ 50

Other Customers' Accounts
Opening balances
New deposits
New balance

$1000
100
$1100

The fraud was to understate both payments and deposits, so that Coleman's
account was over-credited and other customers' accounts were under-credited.
Adequate controls to defeat this scheme, mentioned in the opinion,
would have been:
(a) for the cashier to receive the checks from the clearinghouse
and compile their amounts for comparison with Coleman's debits
to depositors' accounts;
(b) for the cashier to compare the total of deposits received by
the bank with the total deposits credited by Coleman; or
(c) for an internal or external auditor to confirm with each depositor the amounts shown in the depositors' accounts. (Here Justice
Holmes thought that might be done by calling in the passbooks,
but that was unnecessary.17)
Justice Holmes pointed out that any of these measures would have exposed
the fraud. However, finding that this kind of fraud was theretofore unknown
and the controls therefore not required by common experience, he upheld
the finding of due care by the directors.
In my corporations course I analyze Bates as above to describe the
concept of internal controls, and point out that modern standards would

17. Coleman's alternative technique, charging (debiting) payments for his checks to other
customers' accounts, would not result in under- or overstatement of aggregate payments or
deposits.
Nevertheless the confirmation device, (c), would work to expose the fraud. Other control
devices for this technique would include such measures as having the cashier compile the
checks drawn on individual accounts and reconcile his or her figures with the bookkeeper's
individual account balances as recorded.
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have required at least procedure (c), and probably all three. I also use it to
point out that if the bank were subject to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
reporting requirements, the question would be whether the controls were
"sufficient" under section 13(b)(2) of the Act, which establishes a federal
minimum standard of care.'
Many other cases found in the casebooks further bear out the thesis
that the duty of care largely involves internal controls. For example, Joy
v. North'9 involved numerous defective controls: the audit committee was
not composed of independent directors but included the CEO; it kept
incomplete minutes; the CEO was domineering and dismissed unsubmissive
subordinates; he distributed no materials or agendas at board meetings, and
left requests for long range planning documents unanswered. In addition,
the company, a bank, had inadequate procedures for obtaining appraisals
and feasibility studies for a real estate loan exceeding the legal limit of 10%
of its capital, which was the cause of the loss in that case.
Still another classic, usually found in the casebooks, is Francisv. United
Jersey Bank,20 in which there were inadequate controls on cash disbursements.
A fourth is a Rule 10b-5 case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.2 1 The
"mail rule" employed by the company in that case, prohibiting employees
from opening mail addressed to Mr. Nay, involved an internal control which
was arguably defective.
Bringing internal controls to the forefront in discussing the duty of
care, as Seligman demonstrates, is enlightening for students. Among other
effects, it forms a basis for suggesting that in cases like Bates the courts
today may well believe that the standard of care for directors would not
be deemed to have been met-which in effect is what the more modern
cases of Joy and Francis hold.
This treatment also raises the question of how modern auditing practices
concerning internal controls might impact the business judgment rule. In
Bates, the officers did nothing when apprised of the cash shortages. This
nonfeasance might not invoke the business judgment rule since no exercise
of a judgment occurred. But if the now customary auditor's management
letter had specified the weaknesses in control and the audit committee had
decided to do nothing about them, the rule presumably would apply because
a "judgment" would have been made. The facts in Bates permit a fruitful
discussion of whether this decision to do nothing would satisfy the require-

18. 15 U.S.C. § 78m. The record-keeping and internal control provisions of § 13(b)(2)
are perhaps the single greatest federal intrusion into corporate governance, establishing civil
and criminal responsibility. Cf. William Cary, Federalismin CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
19. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
20. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
21. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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ment of the rule that the directors must rationally believe that a decision is
in the best interests of the corporation. 22
Doubtless Professor Seligman would applaud this kind of attention to
accounting concepts as precisely the type of approach which he suggests in
his article for teaching the duty of care cases.
However, the above treatment of Bates v. Dresser alone would take up
at least one class hour, of perhaps three hours that typically are allocated
to covering all aspects of the duty of care. Is the one-hour discussion of
Bates enough to convey a sufficient knowledge of accounting? Clearly not.
Students will not even adequately understand the function of internal
accounting controls or an audit from this illustration. Nor will an understanding of the internal control requirements of § 13(b)(2) be obtained. At
most it sensitizes them to the importance of this realm. And there is much
more accounting beyond internal controls that is important to lawyers. For
example, even if treated to the above analysis of Bates v. Dresser, I.M.
Counsel in the Microscript hypothetical above would not have been prepared
to perceive most of the red flags which Bobbie Catchett saw.
Professor Seligman does not purport to say that one can provide lawyers
with all they need to know about accounting by teaching the duty of care
cases. What he does do very effectively is to illustrate how accounting
knowledge can be extraordinarily enlightening in a single corner of the law.
I am prompted to suggest here that just as law students can benefit greatly
from this interdisciplinary knowledge when considering directors' and officers' duty of care, they may profit equally in innumerable other areas of
the law from further exposure to accounting concepts.
C.

SHOULD LAW SCHOOLS UNDERTAKE TO SUPPLY TO LAW STUDENTS
Soim DEGREE OF EXPERTISE IN ACCOUNTING ISSUES?

1.

Accounting Skills Benefit Many Areas of Law Practice.

Seligman has demonstrated that lawyers can be greatly enlightened about
the duty of care by an awareness of internal controls; so too can they be
assisted in an extraordinary variety of practice problems by other accounting
concepts.
For example, accounting issues predominate in many damages suits. In
one mammoth case with which I am familiar, alleging injuries to over 6,000
individuals from exposure to asbestos fibers, the issues for punitive damages
purposes include calculation of profits on the asbestos product when the
manufacturer also produces other related products. To make the calculation,
one must consider "joint costing"-how a firm allocates to its various
products the joint production costs of its manufacturing operations. In

22. See PRmNCiPLES OF CoRPoRATE GovERNAN C § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992) for
one statement of the elements of the business judgment rule.
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addition, the defendant corporation's equity is negative as the result of a
recapitalization that included a huge cash dividend. The defendant is intimating pauperism as evidenced by this "deficit." An explanation of how
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are based on historical
cost, not fair market values, will be useful to the jury in understanding the
true meaning of this "deficit," i.e., that in fact no deficit exists when fair
market values are used in lieu of historical costs. The coverage of both
23
these issues is standard in a course on accounting for lawyers.
Further, a law school course in accounting clearly is essential for a
minimal understanding of disclosure issues in securities law. To illustrate,
the Management's Discussion and Analysis24 required in most disclosure
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission 25 is the disclosure item
of primary concern to the SEC and the securities law plaintiffs' bar. It
therefore is standard practice now (a change from a few years ago) for
corporate counsel to be intimately involved in its drafting, along with the
chief financial officer, other top managers, and the auditors. The Management's Discussion and Analysis is an accounting and financial disclosure
matter that provides a sophisticated analysis of the meaning behind the
financial statements. 26 Only a thorough grounding in financial statement
analysis can equip a lawyer to perform this task adequately.
Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that accounting is at the heart of
the entire securities law disclosure system. As a result, securities lawyers
must acquire substantial accounting expertise.
The same is true for tax lawyers, and I suspect most bankruptcy lawyers
would echo this view. Even domestic relations matters often involve accounting issues in property settlements. In fact, my experience is that
business law enters into the work of most lawyers, and knowledge of
accounting will be useful in virtually every type of practice.
2. The Preservation of the Roles of Lawyers as Advisers to Management
May Depend on Lawyers Having Accounting Skills.
Lawyers as a group also have a pecuniary reason for having accounting
expertise. E. L. Kitrell Smith, a corporate executive and turnaround specialist
who is also a lawyer and a Certified Public Accountant, in 1992 conducted
a survey of the teaching of accounting in law schools. In a letter to the
author dated June 15, 1993, he states:
We, the legal profession, are in competition with the accounting
profession. We compete for our joint client's confidence so that

23. See Fiais, supra note 2, at 125-54, 224-25, 248-54.
24. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1982).
25. See, for example, registration statements (e.g., Form S-1, item 11(h)), and proxy

disclosures in annual reports to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)1 to -3(b)(5)(ii) (1992).
26. See F=nis, supra note 2, at 517-23.
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the referral of business matters will be addressed to our attention.
Well, our profession is losing that competitive race. One-fourth of
the CPA exam is devoted to an understanding of our profession,
and yet we persistently deny that we need to know anything about
them. My goodness! That's a very short sighted approach to the
protection of our profession. As confirmation of the fact that
accountants are winning the race, just look at the new branch of
accounting "management advisory services". That new approach to
the client by accountants may have started as offering computer
expertise and incorporating audit procedures in the computer programs, of clients, but the services offered have extended far beyond
this original concept. I ought to know, for as a business man I will
call my accountants at least ten times more frequently than my
27
lawyers.

3.

Nevertheless the Law Schools Are Generally Uninterested in Offering
an Appropriate Accounting Course.

Despite the apparent benefit to lawyers, the law schools, with less than
a handful of exceptions, ignore teaching accounting skills. Smith further
stated in his letter:
You will recall that one of the questions in the survey was whether
the particular school being surveyed participated in a joint degree
program wherein a student could receive an MBA as well as a JD
degree. In those instances where such degrees were offered, the
respondents indicated that the teaching of accounting theory was
left to the "other side," the MBA program, and the student
receiving the joint degree might or might not have taken an accounting curriculum. Joint curriculums were offered in approximately 50% of the schools responding....
In those schools not having a joint degree program, there was
little, if any, interest expressed in the teaching of accounting theory
to law students. Basically the schools took the position that such
theory was learned in an undergraduate curriculum and was not a
proper subject for the law school to teach. If it was taught, and
less than 5% of the schools responding taught the subject, it was
covered in a two hour course or combined with other fundamental
courses offered through the law school as subject matter to which
the law student should have "some exposure". Any such courses
offered were being taught by professors with law degrees, but
without any required expertise in accounting.

27. Letter from E. L. Kitrell Smith to Ted J. Fiflis (June 15, 1993) (on file with author).
In England, accountants, not lawyers, for many years have been the primary advisors in
sophisticated business transactions.

THOUGHTS ON NEW CORPORATE LAW

1993]

...
Other schools, but still in the 5%, responded favorably to
the survey, but their programs were either in their infancy or were
desired objectives to be presented to faculty planning meetings in
the fall.
After reviewing all survey results, I concluded that law schools
generally were uninterested in the subject matter of accounting or
had abdicated responsibility for the teaching of the subject matter
to their counterparts within an MBA program .... 21

4.

Why Aren't Law Schools Offering an Adequate Accounting Course?

If lawyers can provide very substantial benefits to their clients from
accounting skills, why is it, as Smith has found, that the law schools largely
are uninterested in offering the course? Is the simple explanation offered
to Smith by those schools a satisfactory one-that law students should learn
their accounting as undergraduates or in MBA programs? Here Smith offers
his own opinion:
To say that the law student is exposed to the subject matter
through the undergraduate curriculum is to hide one's eyes to the
obvious, that students are in law school because they hate "math",
can't add, and want nothing to do with numbers. To say that the
MBA curriculum covers such subjects also misses the mark. It's
very possible to receive an MBA degree with little, if any, accounting
exposure. And so, we persist in turning out "business lawyers"
who don't understand the language of business .... 29
One may add that a comprehensive one-semester course covering internal
controls, cost accounting, recognition of revenues and the myriad other
accounting issues of great relevance to lawyers described in Part D below
simply is not offered in the undergraduate or MBA programs.
Nor are most accountants or business school accounting instructors
equipped to teach a course for lawyers. Selecting out the matters relevant
to lawyers demands expertise not only in accounting but also in law. Only
a course designed by and for lawyers can provide them what they need.
In my experience, there are a number of other elements at work here
to explain the apparent lack of enthusiasm for such a course offering:
(a) First, few law teachers are skilled in accounting;
(b) Many of the few who are skilled have no interest in teaching
the accounting course. This may be due to a teacher's natural
hesitancy to offer a course in the face of student antagonism toward
"hard" courses or courses they believe (mistakenly) to be less than

28. Id.
29. Id.
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intellectually challenging. It is my belief that it may also be due in
part to many teachers' own failure to appreciate the challenges and
value of the course;
(c) Perhaps the overarching reason for the limited inclusion of an
accounting course in the law schools is that it may be the quintessential victim of the current antipractical mind-set that is now
affecting legal education. 30 In an age when teaching any legal
doctrine is attacked by numerous academics," there is even greater
opposition to the much misunderstood accounting course.
5. Accounting Is Too Important to be Left to the Accountants.
For me the solution has been to try to understand the profound
importance of accounting to society, and then to attempt to convey that
understanding to students.
For example, accounting practices have a great impact on the distribution of wealth in this country in numerous ways. One of these is the
income tax laws' use of the realization convention for recognizing taxable
income. If unrealized appreciation in the value of securities and other
properties were taxed, instead of taxing it only when realized by sale, and
then only if sale is before the owner's death, the tax rates could be
substantially reduced on earned income1 2 This is an obvious subsidy to
property owners by those who earn their income through salaries or wages.
Another mode of wealth redistribution occurs from the accounting
principle calling for regulated entities to "normalize" tax expense for
purposes of ratemaking. The result is to force ratepayers to pay billions of
dollars to utility companies to cover "taxes" that the companies need never
pay. This obviously shifts wealth to corporate constituents other than the
coverage
ratepayers. The explanation is too lengthy and technical to merit
33
here, but it is, again, part of a law school accounting course.
Other illustrations abound.
In addition to wealth distribution effects, accounting also affects the
allocation of productive resources. An important current illustration is the
proposal to require for tax purposes amortization of intangible costs,
including goodwill, over a period of fourteen years. Many "high tech"
companies whose research and development has a much shorter useful life
will incur a substantial tax increase if the fourteen-year period is adopted.
This will cut profits and therefore decrease investors' interest in those

30. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. Rv. 34 (1992).
31. One is reminded of the incident upon the occasion of the retirement of one of the
giants of the Harvard Law School when an earnest young faculty member asked the retiree if
he regretted having wasted his life in writing and teaching doctrine.
32. See Finis, supra note 2, at 124.
33. See id. at 274-80.
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companies. On the other hand, those same investors may rush to buy some
of the firms which are now bloated with the goodwill acquired in prior
merger binges that has not until now been tax-deductible. Thus an investor
might sell his computer software company shares and buy RJR-Nabisco,
thereby voting to produce more crackers and less software.
Not only do accounting treatments affect wealth redistribution and
productive resource allocation, but they also affect risks of one socioeconomic group vis-A-vis another. The savings and loan debacle is the most
dramatic illustration. Because of regulatory and disclosure accountifig choices
in the 1980s, $250-$500 billion in losses have been shifted from insured
4
depositors to taxpayers.

Wider recognition of the impact that accounting has on all of us would
doubtless engender more intellectual interest on the part of students and

would help attract more highly qualified teachers.
D.

THE

APPROPRIATE CONTENT OF A COURSE IN ACCOUNTING IssuEs FOR

LAwYERS

What should be the content of this amazingly fascinating course for
lawyers?
1. The Double Entry Bookkeeping System
The first question is whether it is necessary to teach a student the
double entry bookkeeping system-how basic financial statements are developed from the myriad activities of a business and how the statements
articulate. By beginning with the common sense proposition that a business's
assets less its liabilities must always equal its net worth, students learn that
every transaction has two aspects. For example, if an asset is added to a.
business, thereby increasing that factor of the equation, either some other
asset will be subtracted (such as cash used to pay for the acquisition), or
some liability (such as accounts payable) or net worth account will be
increased. The recording of these two aspects is double entry bookkeeping.
Everything else in accounting derives from this beginning-it is the big bang
of accounting.
For example, from this, students perceive that the financial statements
"articulate." By articulation, accountants mean that the statements (such
as the balance sheet, cash flow and income statements) directly correlate.
Thus one may derive income and cash flow for a period by comparing
certain elements of the balance sheet accounts (or their underlying ledger
accounts) at the beginning and end of that period. To illustrate, income (or
loss) is the difference between balance sheet equity at the end and the
beginning of a period.

34. See id. at 136, 149-52, 317-18.
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Skilled accountants, because they understand this articulation, also
understand how recognition of an item or a change in the measurement of
a particular account affects the other financial statements. This facility is
also useful for lawyers. Thus, for example, a lawyer can get a better grasp
on inventory fraud by realizing that for every dollar by which inventory is
overstated, net income before taxes is overstated.35 He or she will also know
6
that net income after taxes may or may not be affected identically.
By way of further example, a lawyer advising in a merger or acquisition
transaction, if familiar with bookkeeping, will understand why "purchase"
accounting, which results in booking a fair market valuation for acquired
assets, including the newly acquired goodwill, will result in reported income
that is usually less than the aggregate of what the two firms' income would
have been without the combination.3 7 He or she will also understand why
a "pooling of interests" accounting will have no such effect but will
aggregate the two firms' incomes even for the year of the combination no
matter how late in the year the combination occurs. 8 These features are
not alternative options and the availability of one or the other accounting
treatment will frequently make or break deals.3 9 Therefore, the lawyer must
understand them.
My own view, and one generally held, is that understanding how
financial statements articulate and how they are impacted by various transactions requires an understanding of the bookkeeping process. For this
reason the course as I offer it requires about three weeks devoted to that
process. For students who have had no background in it, this requires
intensive effort, while those who studied accounting for a year or more as
undergraduates need spend very little time. If teachers make the students
aware of this schedule at the outset, and promise the beginners that
thereafter they will be on a level playing field with the CPA's in the class,
the beginners are able to tolerate it. 40
Most students are greatly interested in being initiated into this new
language of business about which they previously had been mystified.
Further, the familiarity with double entry bookkeeping makes them more
receptive to all accounting knowledge, thus easing the way for the rest of
the course.

35. Id. at 215.
36. Inventory for tax purposes may be carried at a different dollar amount from inventory
for financial accounting purposes, although for "last in first out" (LIFO) accounting there is
a "booking" requirement calling for use of LIFO for financial reporting purposes if it is used

for tax purposes. See id. at 231-37.
37. Id. at 449-53.
38. Id. at 453-58.
39. Id. at 456-57.
40. Other law teachers have a lesser regard for the need to teach students the bookkeeping
process but seek to achieve the same ends otherwise. See STANLEY SIEGEL & DAvW A. SrEGEL,
AccouNTiNo AND FINANCIAL DiscLosuRE (1983).
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Who Makes GAAP? The Functions of Auditing and Control

Just as lawyers need to know the sources and the hierarchy of law, so
too they must know who makes generally accepted accounting principles,
what accounting principles are, the hierarchy of authority, and where to
look to find accounting principles when their work calls for it. These are
taught in a conventional law school course, although not generally taught
in business schools.4 A few class hours spent on these subjects will make
students aware of these resources for solving legal issues that involve
accounting.
In addition, as more and more litigation arises it has become apparent,
as Professor Seligman has pointed out, that lawyers, not only as litigators
but also as advisors to management, must be aware of the audit function
and its dynamics, 42 as well as the concept of internal controls and how they
apply in audits and under § 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act-the accounting
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 43 An hour or so is merited
on this topic at a minimum.
3.

Income Recognition and the Realization Convention

Perhaps the portion of the course meriting the greatest amount of
energy and time is that dealing with the various conventions of realization
of income (including both revenues and expenses) and when that income is
to be recognized for financial reporting, taxation, contractual interpretation,
rate regulation, management, etc. This material is inherently interesting
because income recognition analysis is very similar to legal analysis. I usually
spend about five weeks on this material.
Legal, economic, financial, and accounting scholars devote careers to
determining when the fruit of a capital investment is mature enough to be
separable from the capital as income. That is because a vast proportion of
the functioning of our society is based on the concepts of capital and
income. A homely example is the "cooked books" phenomenon of our
Microscript hypothetical-cooking the books largely involves plucking the
fruit before it is ripe.
There are many examples of the importance of drawing the line between
income and capital: financial reporting under the securities laws focuses on
income, as does income taxation, regulation of public utilities, and regulation
of other entities involving a public interest including financial institutions
such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension trusts, securities
brokerage firms, and private trusts. In all of these areas, law and lawyers
are heavily involved.
The purposes of legal controls on income recognition and realization in
these various realms differ. For example, the function of financial reporting

41. See Firus, supra note 2, at 83-106.
42. Id. at 106-17, ch. XIV.
43. Id. at 118-19, 676-83.
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is to enable investors to make investment decisions, whereas the function
of income taxation is to provide the government with funds in a feasible
way.

44

Because of the variety of issues, it is necessary to teach students about
the fundamentals of income recognition and how the conventions may be
altered depending on the particular function involved. Clearly the best
vehicle for this process, because it is the most developed in its details and
is usually the presumed basis for interpreting the particular regulation, is

income recognition under generally accepted accounting principles.
Thus, students should be taught that income realization is a matter of
convention, not immutable principle-as may be demonstrated by GAAP's
historical development from realization only by cash receipt, to realization
when substantial completion of the product or services and a market
transaction have occurred. They also should be aware of the historical trend

away from requiring a market transaction, evidenced most recently by the
move to "marking to market" for financial assets and liabilities. 45 They
should be alerted as well to sham transactions as well as transactions among
related parties who must nevertheless account separately for income.
Further, the unsolved problem of accounting for income from services
in the vastly expanded service sector of our economy is likely soon to test

the continuing viability of accounting in its present form and lawyers should
know of this tremendous weakness in accounting thought.4
4. Regulation of Distributions to Stockholders
Since practitioners in every state deal with corporations organized in

other states, a modicum of familiarity with the laws of the various states
concerning corporate distributions is required. 47 Most corporations casebooks

44. An example of a disastrous result of lawyers' naivet6 about accounting for income
is the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1971). For example, §
1606(i) provided for the aggregation and redivision of 7001o of "all revenues" among the 12
Regional Corporations-paying absolutely no heed to expenses, although presumably the
drafters meant "income" not "revenues." Thus the Arctic Slope Native Association might
have $50 million of revenues and $5 million of expenses or $45 million income, and the
Tanana Chiefs Conference might have the same revenues, but $45 million of expenses or $5
million income. Assuming, for illustrative purposes only, those were the only two Regional
Corporations and they had an equal number of members, the Arctic Slope corporation, which
had income of $45 million, could be entitled to keep it all while the Tanana Chiefs would get
only $5 million; i.e., no redivision would take place at all-presumably not the intended result.
(In fact the litigation over the poorly worded statute gave the lawyers much revenue. Presumably
no one sued the lawyers responsible for the inept legislative drafting).
45. See AcCOUNTiNo FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUITY SEcURITIEs, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993);
DIscLosuREs ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FiNANciAL

INSTRUMENTS, Statement of Financial Accounting

Standards No. 107 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1991).
46. All of these matters are covered intensively in FnFL's, supra note 2, chs. III-VII.
47. See id. ch. VIII.
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deal inadequately with this topic in that they do not fully explain how
GAAP do or do not apply and the effects on the dividend pool as GAAP
change over time. Further, developments such as the adoption by approximately fifteen states of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)
provisions on distributions and the recapitalization boom of the late 1980s
has changed the ball game substantially, as many companies became highly
leveraged. 48 The Revised MBCA introduces new interpretation problems.
The recapitalization movement caused much development of dividend lore
as lawyers were asked for legal opinions on the validity of dividends when
a deficit in net worth resulted under GAAP. Thus this area of the law has
been revitalized and requires attention once more.
With all the developments in other areas of corporate law in recent
years, it seems inappropriate to devote attention to this subject in the
corporations course. It is better covered in the accounting course in which
the necessary matrix of accounting has been supplied to permit a sophisti49
cated understanding of the subject.
In addition, the course must deal with the fact that contractual limitations on distributions in debt instruments are now the most important
subject for study.50
5. FinancialAnalysis
Lawyers traditionally have assumed the role of private financial advisor
to clients who need or seek such advice. More recently, because all public
companies subject to reporting and registration requirements under the
federal securities acts must publish a Management's Discussion and Analysis
of financial data,5' counsel to such companies have inherited a substantially
increased need to be familiar with financial analysis. For this reason, it
appears to be an essential part of the law school accounting course and
52
requires a few class hours.
These five areas of study would provide at least the beginning of
wisdom for law students who wish adequately to prepare for the practice
of law.
E.

CONCLUSION

Virtually all lawyers need a modicum of skills in accounting in order
to practice law well. To some extent this knowledge may be supplied in

48. Id. at 382.

49. One suspects that some lawyers may be unaware that the terms "net profits,"
"surplus," and "capital" in the statutes on distributions often do not refer to the accountants'
parallel concepts. See William P. Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 791 (1965), which brilliantly exposes the sources of potential

misunderstandings.
50. See Fuus, supra note 2, at 431-43.
51. See supra text accompanying note 24.
52. See Finis, supra note 2, ch. X.
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various other law school courses such as the corporations course. But
corporations covers only a small part of what lawyers need to know and
cannot provide sophisticated coverage. Yet most law schools ignore this
need for reasons that seem to me insupportable. A specially tailored course
in accounting issues for lawyers seems necessary and desirable and can
reward both students and teachers. The contents of that course should
include a sophisticated treatment of accounting issues as they commonly
arise in law practices.

